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Common Law and Statutory Protection
of the Farm Enterprise in Illinois
HAROLD

I.

W. HANNAH*

INTRODUCTION

The passage of "right-to-farm" acts in Illinois' and in other states2
reflects a legislative concern in preserving the farm enterprise. Other
Illinois law, such as that of zoning, nuisance and land development,
can also be regarded as protective of agriculture. In addition, court
decisions have articulated the philosophical foundations of this goal.3
This article will focus on the language and holdings of these laws
and cases and how they will affect the effort to reduce conversion
of Illinois farmland, especially prime farmland, to other uses.4 Laws
and decisions that influence retention of land, as opposed to those
concerning who will farm, will be addressed.' Emphasis will be placed
on zoning, nuisance and land development law. 6 Environmental regulations and laws affecting limitations on the use of water, farmland
preservation, agricultural areas, sediment control, strip mining, mine

* Professor Emeritus of Agricultural and Veterinary Medical Law, University of Illinois and Adjunct Professor of Agricultural Law, Southern Illinois University.
The author acknowledges the helpful research and careful manuscript editing
of his research assistant, Kay Lindbeck, student, School of Law, Southern Illinois
University.
1. ILL.

REV.

STAT.

ch. 5,

§§ 1101-1105 (1983).

2. North Carolina, Florida, Mississippi and Iowa are among the states that
have passed such acts.
3. See infra notes 15-42 and accompanying text.
4. Prime farmlands are described as "having the best combination of physical
and chemical characteristics for producing food, feed, forage, fiber and oilseed crops."
7 C.F.R. § 657.5(a)(1) (1984). Generally, they have a good water supply, a "favorable"
temperature, "acceptable" salt content and few rocks. Id.
5. The preservation of the family farm is not addressed.
6. The broader aspects of farmland protection were addressed in the Second
Governor's Conference on the Protection of Illinois Farmland, Doc. No. 83/01, Ill.
Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, 48 pp. (December 1982). In addition, a
comprehensive summary of citizen efforts to preserve Illinois farmland was published.
See A. SAX & B. BRUNDAGE, HOLDING OUR GROUND: A DIRECTORY OF CITIZENS'
EFFORTS TO PRESERVE FARMLAND IN
BRUNDAGE].

ILLINOIS

(1982)

[hereinafter cited as

SAX

&
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subsidence, drainage (when farm and city land are involved), as well
as a few laws of lesser import, will be examined. 7
II.

ENCROACHMENTS

ON FARMLAND AND

CONDUCT OF THE FARM ENTERPRISE

That there are significant reductions on the supply of farmland
in general is illustrated by the following:
The seemingly inexhaustible supply of agricultural land and open
space that America was so blessed with is rapidly diminishing. In
fact, the irretrievable commercial development of agricultural land
is reaching near epidemic proportions. Approximately three million
acres are converted each year from agricultural to nonagricultural
uses, with one-third of that coming from the nation's cropland base.
In addition, "[bly the year 2000, most if not all of the nation's
540 million acre cropland base is likely to be in cultivation." 8
The Illinois Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Farmland Protection estimates that about 100,000 acres of Illinois agricultural land
is lost annually to housing, shopping malls, factories, and other nonagricultural uses.

9

A. URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION AND
RESIDENTIAL ENCLAVES
It is estimated that about 10076 of the annual reduction in cropland
is lost to urban development.'" Though this accounts for only a modest
7. Among laws not discussed, though occasionally referred to, are farm credit

laws such as the Illinois Farm Development Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1201-1214
(1983); alien land ownership, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-9 (1983); the Agricultural
Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (disclosure of foreign investment in farmland),

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 601-608 (1983); the farmer's right to market his produce
free of city licenses (referred to informally as the Farmers Protection Act), ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 5, § 91 (1983); environmental protection (except for regulations affecting
farmers), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1001-1051 (Environmental Protection Act);
minerals (other than surface mining and mine subsidence), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96V2
(1983) (natural resources); water (other than restrictions on the right to use),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19 (1983) (canals and waterway improvements); drainage districts,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42 (1983); and weather modification, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34,
§ 429.28 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11, § 7316 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§§ 1301-1311 (1983). Federal law is not addressed.

8. Hanna, Right to Farm Statutes-The Newest Tool in Agricultural Land
Preservation, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415 (1981) (footnotes omitted) (quoting figures

from NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, 1981 Final Report 8 (1981).
9. Mt. Vernon (Illinois) Register News, June 28, 1983, at 9-A.
10. Geier, Agricultural Districts and Zoning: A State-Local Approach to a
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fraction of total loss, its impact on people is disproportionate to the
number of acres involved. Farmers complain of trespass, accumulations of trash, damaged fences, disturbance of livestock, disruption
of tile lines and increase of surface drainage water. Subdivision
residents complain of livestock odor, noise, dust, vermin, fertilizers,
and farm chemicals. In a study of the problems connected with farming next to rural subdivisions," the Center for Governmental Studies
at Northern Illinois University found, in addition to these farmer complaints, that vandalism and theft of farm crops and other property
were also cited by farmers.
Reporting on a rural land use survey made in Massac County,
Jeff Ashauer, Director of the Southern Five Regional Planning District
stated:
A rural land use survey conducted in early 1980 revealed a pattern of significant non-farm rural residential growth. Two hundred
seventy-six new nonfarm homes were identified in the 10-year period
prior to 1980. Almost 1,380 farm acres had been converted to residential. Additionally, the majority of these acres had been converted
since 1975 which left a definite feeling of immediate need with local
farmers serving on the committee.' 2
In this report Ashauer stated also that "some Massac County farmers
became alarmed at the number of nuisance suits filed against farmers
by non-farm rural residents throughout Illinois."' 3
Enclaves (residential islands in the country) present the same problems as subdivisions but pose a lesser threat of nuisance since it cannot be so strongly argued that a livestock farmer "stands in the way
of progress" and that the "coming to" defense is unavailable.
While a farmer can live with trespass, vandalism, and trash, a
nuisance action can put him out of business-at least out of the
livestock business. Hence state legislatures have hastened to enact
"right-to-farm" laws which restrict in varying degrees the effectiveness
of the common law nuisance action when a farmer is the defendant.
Industrial neighbors are likely to be less interested in nuisance
suits against farmers; on the contrary, they have been and will conNational Problem, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 658 n. 11 (1980) (citing Krause & Hair, Trends

in Land Use and Competition for Land to Produce Food and Fiber, in U.S.

OF AGRICULTURE,

PERSPECTIVES ON PRIME LANDS

1 (1975).

DEP'T.

11. Center for Governmental Studies at Northern Illinois University, Impacts
of Rural Residential Development on Adjacent Farming Areas in DeKalb County,
noted in

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, AG SCENE 2

[hereinafter cited as Impacts].

12. Impacts, supra note 11, at 34.
13. Id.

(1980). Doc. No. 83/01
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tinue to be defendants in nuisance actions brought by farmers. The
residential dweller, denied the complete enjoyment of his demesne
because of his farmer-neighbor, is the primary target of the antinuisance action movement.
B.

THE COMMON LAW NUISANCE THEORY

The classification of nuisances as per se or per accidens, as private
as statutory or common law, is common knowledge in every
public,
or
law school property classroom in the country. Therefore, this discussion will not further define and refine these distinctions but will indicate how application of the nuisance theory by other courts has
affected the farming enterprise.
Though the "leading cases''' 4 have not arisen in Illinois, there
is nevertheless sufficient Illinois precedent dating from at least 1887
to indicate that Illinois farmers fare not better (or worse) in nuisance
actions than those in other states. Straws in the wind, though a
livestock operation as such was not involved, came from Seacord v.
People," an 1887 Illinois Supreme Court case in which the defendant
was indicated under a nuisance law in that he "unlawfully and willfully
did cause and suffer the carcasses of diverse dead animals, and large
quantities of offal, filth and noisome substances . . . to be collected,
deposited and remain near the dwelling houses of [four named persons] . . .and others."' 6 The defendant operated a rendering plant
and though convicted did introduce significant elements of defensenamely, that his business was beneficial in relieving farms of dead
animals, especially pertinent because of a hog cholera epidemic, that
the area was not thickly settled, that he used approved methods, that
some of the complainants used his services, and that only when he
was "rushed" because of the number of dead hogs did objectionable
conditions prevail. Nevertheless the court found that the statute had
The
been violated and that his proffered defenses were of no avail.
7
1
defense.
a
not
was
intent
of
court said also that absence
Twenty years later the Supreme Court of Illinois in Oehler v.
Levy' 8 decided that the facts substantiated a claim of nuisance where
a stable keeper kept twenty horses in proximity to apartment dwellers
14. See infra notes 38 & 39.
623, 13 N.E. 194 (1887).
15. 121 Ill.
16. Id.at 626, 13 N.E. at 195.
17. Id.at 630-31, 13 N.E. at 197.
450
595, 85 N.E. 271 (1908). See also Minke v.Hopeman, 87 Ill.
18. 234 111.
(1877), where a slaughter house operator was enjoined.

[1985:2011

FARM ENTERPRISE

in the City of Chicago. Manure, odor, noise, and the loud and obscene
language of the hostlers were cited.' 9 Of more significance to present
concerns than the opinion in Levy is a quote in the Levy case from
Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney,' ° which had in turn quoted
with approval from Wier's Appeal' that:
Carrying on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place
remote from buildings and public roads does not entitle the owner
to continue it in the same place after houses have been built and
roads laid out in the neighborhood .... As the city extends, such
nuisances should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the immediate neighborhood of the residence of the citizens. This public
policy, as well as the health and comfort of the population of the
city, demands. 2
It is remarkable that this statement made 75 years ago seems to
decimate the "coming to" defense in nuisance actions, a development we associate with the more recent expansion of urban areas.
Some later cases indicate that when the interest of the complainant is economic rather than residential, the "coming to" theory is
alive and well. In Arbor Theater Corp. v. Campbell Soup Co.,2 3 a
nuisance action brought by a theater operator against a mushroom
farmer failed where the facts showed that the mushroom operator
had been in existence for 14 years before the theater was built. In
Wheat v. Freeman Coal Mining Corp.,2 4 farmers recovered damages
from a coal company for the effects of dust and fumes resulting from
the operation of the company's nearby mine. The court stated that
not only had the mine begun operation after the farmers had bought
the property, but the fact that plaintiff's knowledge that the area was
a likely location for a coal mine would not bar plaintiff's recovery."
In 1909 an Illinois appellate court upheld a village ordinance prohibiting a horse breeding enterprise within the village.26 More recently,
in 1964, an Illinois appellate court upheld an award of damages against
a livestock farmer whose manure pile was found to have washed into
the plaintiff's well during the rainy season.2 7
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 596-97, 85 N.E. at 271.
131 I11.322, 23 N.E. 389 (1890).
74 Pa. 230 (1873).
234 Ill. at 605, 85 N.E. at 273-74.
11 II1. App. 3d 89, 296 N.E.2d 11 (1973).
23 II1. App. 3d 14, 319 N.E.2d 290 (1974).
Id. at 17-18, 319 N.E.2d at 294.
Village of Plymouth v. McWherter, 152 111.App. 114 (1909).
Van Brocklin v. Gudema, 50 Ill. App. 2d 20, 199 N.E.2d 457 (1964).
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A later pronouncement was made in 1981 by the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Fifth District in Woods v. Khan,2 8 the court holding
that the defendant was properly enjoined from operating his chicken
farm because of the odors generated and the proximity to complainants' houses. In this case the court recognized considerations which
had been taken into account by courts in other jurisdictions-namely,
the importance of the industry29 (people need chickens and eggs), the
possibility of corrective action to alleviate the nuisance,3" The suitability
of the area for defendant's enterprise, 3 ' who was there first, 32 and
whether or not modification of the facility is practical.33 The injunction was upheld despite testimony indicating that the manure could
be handled so as not to create a nuisance.34
A procedural point of some consequence was involved in Khan.
The hearing had been set to consider only the suitability of an injunction, so some plaintiffs did not appear. The complaints of those
not, appearing were dismissed. The appellate court reversed the order
of dismissal, noting that those plaintiffs had not been alerted that
their cause of action for damages could also be dismissed.
Despite the declining importance of the "coming to" theory as
a defense, courts have recognized at least four principles of some help
to the beleaguered livestock farmer. One of these was recognized in
Khan-namely, the possibility of correction, thus forestalling a permanent injunction. 36 The others are the awarding of damages in lieu
of a permanent injunction, 37 allowing a reasonable time for the enterprise to sell out and move, 3' and, when an injunction is granted, requiring the successful plaintiff to reimburse the defendant. 39 Such a
principle was announced in the much-publicized case of Spur Industries
Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.4 1 Significant in this case is
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
494 P.2d
40.

95 Il. App. 3d 1087, 420 N.E.2d 1028 (1981).
Id.at 1090, 420 N.E.2d at 1030.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1090-91, 420 N.E.2d at 1031.
Id. at 1091-92, 420 N.E.2d at 1031-32.
Id.
Valley Poultry Farms v. Preece, 406 S.W.2d 413 (1966).
Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309,
-, 187 N.E.2d 142, 146 (1963).
See Spur Industries v. Del E.Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178,
700, 708 (1972).
108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). See Comment, Plaintiff Required to

Indemnify Defendant for Losses Resulting From Permanent Injunction in a Nuisance
Case: Spur Industries, Inc. v.. Del E. Webb Development Co., 1973

UTAH

L.

REV.

[1985:2011

FARM ENTERPRISE

the fact that many people to whom Webb had sold residential
properties were affected by the defendant's cattle feed yards.' The
court held that some of Spur's cost of moving or ceasing operations
must be paid by Webb, whose land developments "brought people
42
to the nuisance."
Regardless of the economic help afforded a farmer as a result
of nuisance actions, in those cases where injunctive relief is granted,
his land is nevertheless lost to agriculture. It is the concern for this
loss as well as the diminishing protection afforded farmers in nuisance
suits that has led to the recent and widespread enactment of right-tofarm statutes.
C.

ZONING

Zoning can either preserve or terminate the use of land for
45
agriculture.4 3 County zoning, when based on a sound regional plan,
as contemplated by the law, provides significant protection from the
encroachment of other businesses in the farming zone. The Illinois
county zoning law and cases construing its effect on the farming
classification are discussed in Section V. In Illinois counties which
are not zoned, townships may zone. 46 However, township zoning has
had a minimal effect on land usage for agriculture.
City zoning, by its very nature and purpose, pushes agriculture
out as the city grows. Some relief for the farmer may come from
a farming zone in the city ordinance and from the non-conforming
use principle. 7
Though a city zoning ordinance may include a farming zone, this
provides only a temporary halt in the elimination of farms, since
growth of the city and the construction of more residences will require modification of the zoning ordinance and the establishment of
new zone boundaries. City building codes48 and ordinances limiting
55 (1973); Comment, Indemnification of a Nuisance Defendant for Costs Incurred
by Complying with an Injunction, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 1004 (1973); Annot. 42 A.L.R.
3d 344 (1972); Annot. 53 A.L.R. 3d 861 (1973).
41. Spur, 108 Ariz. at

__,

494 P.2d at 708.

42. Id. at
-, 494 P.2d at 708.
43. See generally Geier, Agricultural Districts and Zoning: A State-Local
Approach to a National Problem, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q. 655 (1980).
44. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 34, §§ 3151-3162 (1983).
45. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 34, § 3001-3007 (1983).
46. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 34, §§ 11-13-1-11-13-20 (1983).
47. See infra notes 158-173 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nonconforming use principle and how it has been construed by Illinois courts.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-30-1 to 11-30-9 (1983).
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the keeping of animals further restrict the right to pursue agricultural
occupations within the jurisdiction of a city.
D.

HIGHWAYS

Highways, especially those in the inter-state system, have taken
a big bite out of Illinois farmland. Methods sometimes employed in
acquisition of land for highways have in addition led to undesirable
farmer-highway authority relations. In 1985, citizens of Madison
County organized to oppose construction of a 5.5 mile extension of
Interstate 255 which would take 500 acres of prime farmland in the
American Bottoms."9 There is evidence, however, that the taking of
additional land has slowed and that the major emphasis of the Department of Transportation in Illinois is now on repair and maintenance."
E.

THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Environmental protection rules and regulations affect the farming operation in two major ways-they are one of the factors which
the farmer must consider in determining what he can grow or what
livestock he can produce; and they increase his cost of production.
When hearings were held on proposed livestock waste regulations
drafted pursuant to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, 5" many
livestock farmers and representatives from agencies serving the livestock
industry made statements or submitted written comments. Appearing
were veterinarians, agricultural credit representatives from banks and
other agencies, livestock equipment suppliers and feed dealers. They
were concerned that adoption of too-stringent regulations would drive
up the cost of production with no corresponding increase in livestock
income, squeeze farmers out of the livestock business, and drive a
significant percentage of the business into adjoining Corn Belt states
having less costly restrictions. These results could occur, but there
is no evidence that any overall trend has been created. Tempering
of the proposed regulations and flexibility of the Pollution Control
Board in enforcing its regulations52 have been important factors in
forestalling these undesirable results.
49. Notes from Illinois South, Vol. 9, No. 2, June, 1983, p. 4.
50. "The Department estimates future impact on farmland by highway construction to be small (1,000 acres or less per year) since emphasis will be on preserving and repairing existing facilities." SAX & BRUNDAGE, supra note 6, at 38.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1001-1051 (1983). The author was hearing
officer.
52. In a cattle feedlot case where violation of specified sections of the
Environmental Protection Act were proved, the Pollution Control Board (in Illinois
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Livestock waste regulations may become more stringent and the
Pollution Control Board may become more hard-nosed. Whether this
occurs depends largely on the political-economic climate.
Limitations on the use of chemicals to control weeds, plant
diseases, harmful insects and other pests influence what crops will
be grown and the cost of producing those crops. The counterpart
of nuisance suits against livestock farmers are suits against farmers
and custom applicators for damage from drifting chemicals. Though
dusting was the principal cause of legal action in an early day, errant
spray materials, though more localized, have led to a significant
amount of litigation." Increased state and federal control of
agricultural chemicals and biological materials has resulted. 4
A newer entrant among the legally controlled pollutants is the
soil itself-through siltation. Within the past decade states have enacted
legislation leading to the establishment of soil loss tolerances and enforcement procedures."
All of these legal deterrents to crop and livestock production,
essential as they are, lead not only to changes in the use of agricultural
land but to some loss of such land. When the cost of production
makes agricultural use non-competitive with other uses, there will be
a shift.
F.

LIMITING THE USE OF WATER

Illinois has not as yet adopted a "water-use law" regulating the
amount of water that different kinds of users are entitled to take.
Some states have such a law. 56 Thus common law rules essentially
determine the right of Illinois farmers to take different types of
the Board has the jurisdiction of an appellate court) concluded its opinion by stating:
We shall, therefore, instead of imposing a penalty, order that Respondent
Loveless cease and desist all violations. We shall also require that he submit
to the Agency, within one year, a plan for permanent compliance with the
Regulations which this Record indicates were violated. We leave to Mr.
Loveless the substance of such a plan.
Environmental Protection Agency v. Loveless, I1l. PCB 75-56, 22 Opinions 99, 105
(1976).
53. See Annot., 37 A.L.R. 833 (1971).
54. The Federal Government currently regulates pesticides under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982). The Illinois
legislature in 1979 repealed several laws and enacted a comprehensive pesticide act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 801-828 (1983).
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 108.01-108.20, 138-3-138.9 (1983).
56. The state of Iowa provides for a comprehensive state-wide plan to control
the utilization and protection of the water resources of the state. IowA CODE ANN.
§§ 455B.261-455B.330 (West Supp. 1985).
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water-ground, stream, surface, rain-for increasing irrigated acreage.
There are, however, a few legislative limitations. The state can regulate
the use of water from navigable streams, and cloud seeders must meet
certain standards before a permit will be granted.57
In 1983 the Illinois General Assembly approved the "Water Use
Act of 1983. '"" Under this act if
a land occupier or person proposes to develop a new point of
withdrawal, and withdrawals from the new point can reasonably be
expected to occur in excess of 100,000 gallons on any day, the land
occupier shall notify the District. The District shall in turn notify
other local units of government with water systems who may be impacted by the proposed withdrawal. The District shall then review
with the assistance of the Illinois State Water Survey the proposed
point of withdrawal's effect upon other users of the water. The findings of such reviews shall be made public."
Though there are no penalties or permit requirements, it is a petty
offense to fail to notify the District." °
As total water usage increases, competition will become more intense and the political and economic significance of water will be of
more importance to concerned pressure groups. If agriculture's share
of available land is diminished, cropping practices which depend on
irrigation will have to be changed, and land that cannot return the
cost of production and some profit without irrigation will give way
to other uses.
G. SPECIAL DISTRICTS

Under enabling laws provided by the Illinois legislature, citizens
can create a variety of special purpose districts. Some of these require land-for example, school, river conservancy, park, and forest
preserve districts. These account annually for some disappearance of
farmland though the amount is small compared to urban encroachment. But all of these districts (Soil and Water Conservation Districts
excepted) are empowered to tax land to procure needed funds. In
an area with a multiplicity of such districts, taxing at or near their
legal limits, farmland bears an additional cost burden which may com57. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 11l,
§ 7328 (1983).

58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1601-1607 (1983) (effective Jan. 1, 1984).
59. Id. § 1605 (footnote omitted).
60. Failure to notify the Soil & Water Conservation District of a proposal to
develop a new point of withdrawal which will take in excess of 100,000 gallons of
water per day is punishable as a petty offense. Id. § 1607.

FARM ENTERPRISE
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bine with other factors to render farming unprofitable and thus terminate agricultural usage.
H.

OTHER INROADS

Surface coal mines have affected approximately 214,450 acres of

farmland in Illinois. 61 Some farmland, the amount difficult to determine, has been lost and will continue to be lost as a result of

subsidence 61 where there has been deep coal mining. As the urge to
develop coal as a prime source of energy continues, this could become

a more serious problem for farmland owners in affected areas. Though

there is a subsidence insurance law which gives some relief to the

owner of structures, it does not afford any relief to farmers whose
land subsides. 61 Water impoundment by the Army Corps of Engineers

and the state removes additional acres. Conveyance of conservation
rights 6" with restrictions on use of the easement thus created may curtail
further agricultural usage.
III.

THE RIGHT-TO-FARM STATUTE

In 1981 the Illinois legislature approved an act "to protect farm'65

ing operations from nuisance suits under certain circumstances."

Thus, Illinois followed the lead of many other states66 in enacting what

have come to be known as "Right-to-Farm" laws.

Applicability of

the common law nuisance theory is limited by statutory language which

states that:

No farm or any of its appurtenances shall be or become a private
or public nuisance because of any changed conditions in the surrounding area occurring after the farm has been in operation for
more than one year, when such farm was not a nuisance at the time
it began operation, provided, that the provisions of this Section shall
not apply whenever a nuisance results from the67negligent or improper
operation of any farm or its appurtenances.
61. 1983 ILLINOIS CoAL FACTS 48. Illinois Coal Association, Springfield, Illinois.
62. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.402 (1983).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.401-1065.413 (1983).

of
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 401-406 (1983) provides for the conveyance
such rights.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1101-1105 (1983).
and
66. For a summary and discussion of these laws, see Hanna, supra note 8

Grossman & Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance
Actions Against the Farmer 1983 Wis. L. REV. 95. The Illinois law, as well as that
of many other states, is modeled after the North Carolina statute. N.C.
§§ 106-701 (Supp. 1983).
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 1103 (1983).

GEN. STAT.
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The statement of purpose is significant:
It is the declared policy of the state to conserve and protect
and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural
land for the production of food and other agricultural products.
When nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural areas, farms
often become the subject of nuisance suits. As a result, farms are
sometimes forced to cease operations. Many others are discouraged
from making investments in farm improvements. It is the purpose
of this Act to reduce the loss to the State of its agricultural resources
by limiting the circumstances under which farming operations may
be deemed to be a nuisance."
How effective in achieving its stated purpose is the law likely
to be? The answer lies primarily with the courts when litigation arises
and with the legislature as future amendments are proposed. As the
law now stands there appear to be at least ten possible restrictions
on its effectiveness. These are listed and discussed below.
A. IS IT A FARM?

The act defines a farm as: "any parcel of land used for the growing and harvesting of crops; for the feeding, breeding and management
of livestock; for dairying or for any other agricultural or horticultural
use or combination thereof." 6 9
This definition leaves many questions unanswered. Are a home
vegetable gardener's beans a "crop"? Is keeping a pony the "feeding
. ..and management of livestock"? Unlike many right-to-farm laws,
the Illinois statute contains no acreage or income measurement in the
definition. Regardless of the broad definition, only a "farm" qualifies
for special treatment. If a court decides that a defendant is not
operating a "farm," he does not qualify for protection under this
statute.
B.

WHAT ARE "ANY OF [THE] APPURTENANCES" OF A FARM?' 0

Some Illinois farms have developed a recreational enterprise; others
operate farm produce retail markets; still others engage in the processing of some of their products (milk, hybrid seed). Thus in a particular case the court will have to determine if the action giving rise
to a nuisance complaint is "appurtenant" to the farm enterprise. 7
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.§ 1101.
Id.§ 1102.
Id.§ 1103.
This question rose in Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance
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If not, then the statute affords no protection.
C.

HAS THE FARM BEEN IN OPERATION FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR?

D.

DO CHANGED CONDITIONS ON THE FARM MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

This would appear to be an easily determined question. However,
if land is being reclaimed for farming (timber is still being cleared;
swampy land is being drained) and the reclamation process takes a
year or longer, as it well might, and crops are not planted and livestock
introduced until less than a year after a residence next to the farm
has been established, from what date will the year be measured?
Related to the length of time the farm has been in operation
is the length of time the particular farm activity giving rise to a complaint has been carried on. Does the statute mean that if it is a "farm"
it doesn't matter that a hog enterprise was commenced within a year
of the complaint-or that possibly the complainant was there long
before such an activity was commenced though the "farm" was there
first? Might the court consider that a change in the nature of the
farm enterprise tolls the running of the year? Would the statute bar
a suit to "enjoin a threatened nuisance" where evidence leads the
court to conclude, as it did in a Georgia Supreme Court case," that
the contemplated enterprise (in that case a "broiler house") could
not be conducted without creating a nuisance? The answer is not clear.
Though one would argue that if being a "farm" is all that is required to invoke the statutory protection, then such a suit should fail.
E.

TIME IT BEGAN OPERATION?
WAS THE FARM A NUISANCE AT THE

73

When does a farm "begin operation"? Did operation begin when
the current operator commenced farming it, or 150 years ago when
the land was cleared or drained and became a farm, or at some other
time? Is the language in the Illinois law just an imprecise way of
saying that all that is required is that the farm have begun operation
at least one year before the occurrence of "changed conditions in
Co., 143 So.2d 389 (La. App. 1962) where a "fishing lodge" was operated on the
farm. A farm premises liability insurer refused to pay for injury received by a party
at the fishing lodge maintaining that it was not a farm enterprise. The court held
that the language of the insurance policy, which also covered "other premises" used
"in connection with" the farm, included the fishing lodge (original emphasis). Id.
at 391.
72. Griffith v. Newman, 217 Ga. 533, 123 S.E.2d 723 (1962).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 1103 (1983).
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the surrounding area"? 4 Some states foresaw this problem and provided, as Florida does, that if the enterprise or boundaries of the
farm are expanded, each such expansion creates a new beginning date
of operation." Having determined the date on which the farm "began
operation," how does the court determine with legal certainty that
it was not a nuisance at such time? Suppose the court determines
that there are "changed conditions in the surrounding area" and that
the poultry farm complained of commenced operating two years prior
to the occurrence of these changed conditions, but the complainant
alleges that it was a nuisance two years ago at the time it commenced
operations. What constitutes proof that it was a nuisance at that time?
Must there have been a legal determination, or is the determination
one that must be made for the first time in a case currently before
the court so that it becomes in effect a nuisance suit within a nuisance
suit? Who has the burden of proof? It can be argued that since the
statute is a limitation on the right of a complainant to maintain a
nuisance action, the burden should be on the farmer once there is
an allegation that a nuisance existed at the time the farm began
operation.
Some analysts of this law may say that these considerations are
fanciful, that in only a very rare case would they arise. But a look
at the nature of the small holdings in urban fringe areas and in residential enclaves in the country reveals many possibilities. An example
is the residential owner who seeks peace, quiet and fresh air next
door to the back-to-nature family with three acres, chickens, ducks,
geese, a cow and a horse. Three acres so used is a farm within the
statutory definition."6
F.

MUST THERE BE "CHANGED CONDITIONS IN THE SURROUNDING
AREA" TO MAKE THE LAW APPLICABLE?

The statute says that "no farm . . . shall . . . become a ...
nuisance because of any changed conditions in the surrounding
area. . .. "" Can it become a nuisance if it is determined by the court
that there are no changed conditions in the surrounding area but that
the introduction of a swine operation upwind from complainants who
are long-time residents has made occupancy of their property
unbearable? Some states have taken this into consideration. The
74. Id.

75. FLA.
76. ILL.
77. ILL.

STAT. ANN.
REV. STAT.

REV. STAT.

§ 823.14(3)(d) (West Supp. 1985).
ch. 5, § 1102 (1983).
ch. 5, § 1103 (1983).
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Mississippi statute has a proviso which protects the livestock farmer
"if the conditions or circumstances alleged to constitute a nuisance
have existed substantially unchanged since the established date of operation." 78 This leads the court then to consider the meaning of "substantially unchanged." Whether or not an Illinois court would read this
into the law is a moot question.
G.

NEGLIGENT OR IMPROPER OPERATION

The protective statute does not apply if "a nuisance results from
the negligent or improper operation of any farm."" What is
negligence? What is improper? Are they different? Perhaps it does
not matter since it must be proved in any case that a nuisance
resulted-and to so prove this there must be an adequate factual showing that something the defendant did or did not do resulted in the
nuisance complained of. How is this determined? It suggests the kind
of test applied to determine if a professional is guilty of malpracticewhat is the standard among like farmers, and has the defendant
measured up. Iowa, the first state to pass a right-to-farm law (1976)
states as a matter of law that with respect to feedlots, compliance
with zoning ordinances and with state environmental regulations is
an absolute defense." The Illinois law leaves the question open. Thus,
a complainant will invariably allege that there is negligence or improper operation and that therefore the protective statute does not
apply. This is perhaps the greatest weakness in the act. However, in
any case where negligence or improper operation is found to cause
the nuisance, a court could withhold the granting of a permanent
injunction for a stated period of time to give the defendant an opportunity to remove the cause.
H.

WATER POLLUTION

The Illinois law provides that:
The provisions of Section 3 of this Act shall not affect or defeat

the right of any person, firm, or corporation to recover damages
for any injuries or damages sustained by them on account of any
pollution of, or change in condition of, the waters of any stream
or on the account of any overflow of lands of any such person,
firm, or corporation."
78.
79.
80.
81.

MIss. CODE ANN. §
ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
IOWA CODE ANN. §
ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

95-3-29(1) (Supp. 1984).
5, § 1103 (1983).
172D.2 (West Supp. 1984-85).
5, § 1104 (1983) (footnote omitted).
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Damages are recoverable only by inference. The act still protects
the farmer from a nuisance action seeking to enjoin his operation.
But if substantial damages are recovered and the pollution or overflow
occurs frequently and cannot be remedied, the defendant might find
it uneconomic to continue operation of the farm.
I.

STATUTORY NUISANCE

Does the Illinois Right-To-Farm Act protect the farmer who
violates the law defining public nuisance? It is a public nuisance, for
example, to allow animal carcasses to collect and to remain8 2on the
premises or to throw carcasses or offal into water sources. More
significant is a provision in the nuisance law defining public nuisances
which states that it is a public nuisance to: "erect, continue or use
any building or other place for the exercise of any trade, employment or manufacture, which, by occasioning noxious exhalations, offensive smells or otherwise, is offensive or dangerous to the health
83 If farming can be defined as a
of individuals, or of the public."
"trade" or "employment" then it is subject to this law, and if its
exhalations or smells are "offensive or dangerous . . .to the health
of individuals" 8 4 they can be abated. Hence, if a complainant can
show that exhalations or smells from the livestock operation are "offensive" to "individuals," ("dangerous to the health" as worded is
a separate result not tied to "offensive") a public nuisance exists,
and the right-to-farm statute would afford no protection. Yet protection of the farmer from action predicated on offensive smells is one
of the purposes of the right-to-farm law. This suggests that a properly
worded exception should be added either to the nuisance law or the
right-to-farm law so that they will not conflict.
Still another consideration with respect to public nuisance is that
cities and counties are empowered to pass ordinances defining public
nuisances." Also, it is a well-established principle of common law
that absent a statute or ordinance if the condition complained of affects
enough people, it will amount to a public nuisance at common law.
Is the farmer protected from city or county ordinances or from a
common law determination that a public nuisance exists? Since the
act purports to protect him from private or public nuisance, the farmer
is probably immune from a common law determination of public
nuisance providing he meets the other requirements of the statute.
82. Id. ch. 100 1/2, § 26(1,2) (1981).
83. Id. § 26(8).
84. Id.
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100 1/2, § 26 (1983).

[1985:201]

FARM ENTERPRISE

217

But it is not likely that he would be regarded as immune from statutory
determination of a public nuisance since these determinations are based
on public health and safety.
A question similar to that posed by the statutory law on public
nuisance is posed by the air pollution provisions of the Environmental
Protection Act. 6 If the discharge of contaminants into the environment causes air pollution, such would be in violation of the act, and
it could be argued that the right-to-farm law would afford no defense.
J.

PRIOR ACTIONS

The right-to-farm law does not protect a farm from actions commenced prior to its effective date, September 16, 1981.87 Added to
all of these possible restrictions on effectiveness of the right-to-farm
law is the possibility that a court might find it unconstitutional as
a deprivation of an important property right.
IV.

THE ILLINOIS FARMLAND PRESERVATION ACT

In 1982 the Illinois legislature enacted the Farmland Preservation Act." The essential provisions of the act were a codification of
Executive Order IV signed by Governor James Thompson on July
22, 1980.9 The findings and intent of the legislature are fairly expressed
in the following paragraph:
The conversion and loss of agricultural land has diminished
Illinois' cropland base and affects environmental quality. The supply of land most suitable for farming is finite. Conversation of this
land to urban development and other non-farm uses reduces future
food production capability and may ultimately undermine agriculture

as a major economic activity in Illinois. With less prime farmland
available there will tend to be greater reliance on marginally productive land, resulting in greater soil erosion, increased fertilizer
requirements and increased environmental damage. Loss of

agricultural land can also reduce the beneficial role which the land
itself can play. Agricultural land reduces runoff by absorbing
precipitation, aids in replenishing groundwater supplies and can buffer environmentally sensitive areas from encroaching development."
86. ILL.

REV.

STAT.

ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1008-1010 (1983).

87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 1105.
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1301-1308 (1983).
89. Exec. Order No. 80-4, 4 Ill. Admin. Reg. Issue 31 at 62 (July 18-Aug.
1, 1980).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 1302 (1983) (this language is identical with paragraph
3 of the policy statement in the Governor's Executive Order).
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The purpose of the law is to "minimize the conversion of prime
farmland that results from the direct or indirect effects of State programs. .. .'"9 Ten state agencies are represented on an inter-agency
committee on farmland preservation.9 2 The Director of the Depart3 Policy
ment of Agriculture or his representative is chairman.
statements and working agreements are to be prepared for each
agency."' These statements specify the policy of each agency regarding farmland preservation and the administrative process used to implement that policy and are to be prepared as rules for the administration of the act." The policy statements detail measures that can be
implemented to reduce the amount of land converted. Policy statements
and working agreements are to be updated by each agency and
reviewed and approved by the Department of Agriculture every three
years and are to be submitted to the Governor and the General
Assembly.6
The law creates a role for the Department of Agriculture similar
9
to that played by the Environmental Protection Agency. When a
state agency participates in a capital project which would lead to the
loss of farmland, the Director of the Department of Agriculture must
be notified.9 The Director then determines if the project is in com9
pliance with the agency's policy statements and working agreements.
If the project is not in compliance the Director must conduct a study
of its agricultural impact.' 0 This study is to be completed within thirty
days of receipt of notification.'"' If not completed within thirty days
the agency has the right to proceed.' 0 2 The law is silent with regard
to agency action after receipt of the impact study and makes no mention of penalties or prohibitions if the agency proceeds with the project. There are, however, two provisions which may have some deterrent effect if the agency disregards the impact study. One requires
that copies of the impact study be submitted to the Governor, to
the President and Minority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker and
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. § 1303.
Id.
Id.§ 1304.
Id.
Id.
Id.§ 1305.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, to the Director of
each State agency participating in the project, and to each member
of the Inter-Agency Committee on Farmland Preservation."03 The other
deterrent is that no agency may commit state funds for land acquisition unless it is provided for in an exception contained in the agency's
working agreement. 04
As the Department of Agriculture becomes geared to administer
this law it may develop rules, regulations, and procedures which will
afford further protection.' 5 For the present, the effect of the law
is well stated in the final paragraph of an analysis contained in the
Agricultural Law Edition of the newsletter of the Illinois State Bar
Association General Practice Section:
Although the Farmland Preservation Act requires serious consideration of the impact of agency projects on farmland in Illinois,
it does not actually prohibit agency activities that adversely affect
farmland. Instead, it serves to publicize the impacts of agency actions
on farmland and to demonstrate that the preservation of farmland
is now a legitimate factor that must be considered seriously by Illinois
agencies. The commitment of the Illinois legislature and the governor toward farmland preservation will encourage state agencies to
curtail, or at least minimize, their use of productive farmland for
nonagricultural activities. 06
V.

THE AGRICULTURAL AREAS LAW

In 1979, two years before enactment of the Right-to-Farm law,
the Illinois legislature passed an Agricultural Areas Conservation and
Protection Act."0 7 The purpose of the act is to: "provide a means
by which agricultural land may be protected and enhanced as a viable
segment of the State's economy and as an economic and environmental
resource of major importance."' 0 °
The act attempts to achieve this purpose through organization
of an "agricultural area" by petition to the county board. There is
no provision in the law for organization of an area which would include lands in two or more counties. There is a minimum requirement of 500 acres'0 9 but no minimum requirement for petitioners;
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1306.
106. Grossman, The Illinois FarmlandPreservationAct, I AGRIC. L. ED. GEN.
PRACT. SEC. ISBA 8, 10 (1983).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5,

108. Id. § 1002.
109. Id. § 1005.

§§

1001-1020 (1983).
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one owner of farmland may petition. Only the land of consenting
owners may be included. ' "
Once a petition is received, the county board must establish an
agricultural areas committee."' The committee, consisting of four active
farmers and one county board member, is appointed by a "county
appointing authority" of three members-the county board chairman,
the county agricultural, extension advisor, and the chairman of the
county soil and water conservation district." 2
As a basis for the area committee recommendation several factors
' 3
be considered:
to
are
1. The viability of active farming in the proposed
area and on adjacent land.""
This goes to the heart of the determination. The law provides
that in judging viability "any relevant agricultural information shall
be considered, including soil, climate, topography, other natural factors, markets for farm products, the extent and nature of farm improvements, the present status of farming, anticipated trends in
agricultural economic conditions and technology, and such other factors
as may be relevant.""'
In addition to these considerations, some of which are subjective
and conjectural, the act contains a definition of "viable farm land"
which must be taken into account. It defines viable farm land as "land
suitable for agricultural production and which will continue to be
economically feasible for such use if real estate taxes, farm use restrictions, and speculative activities are limited to levels approximating
those in commercial agricultural areas not influenced by the6 proximity of urban and related non-agricultural development."'1
This not only introduces additional subjective considerations, it
contains a term which is also defined in the law-"agricultural production." So, in addition to making findings about "relevant
agricultural information" and determining if the land meets the definition of "viable," the committee and board must also find that this
definition is satisfied. The act states that "agricultural production"
i10. Id.

111. Id. §
established for
112. Id. §
113. Id. §
114. Id. §
115. Id. §
116. Id. §

1004 (provided that no such county committee has already been
such county).
1003.08.
1008.
1008(a)(1).
1008(b).
1003.4.
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means: "the production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock
for proand livestock products, but not land or portions thereof used
' 7
cessing of such crops, livestock or livestock products." "1
2.

The presence of viable farmlands that are not in active farming, 8

This requires the board and areas committee to look to an additional definition-"active farmer." This means "any individual actively involved in the day-to-day operation or management of a farm
deriving at least 50% of his gross income from such management
or operation."'' 9
By inference, lands not in active farming would be land from
which less than 50% of the gross income from "any included activity
involved in . . .day-to-day operation or management" is procured.
The law does not define "individual" or "actively involved." Are
corporations, farm tenants, farm laborers "individual"? Or does
individual mean only owner? If a corporation qualifies as an individual,
it could own a large acreage of viable farmland which would not
qualify if more than 50% of the corporation's income is from nonfarming. The same would be true of a professional man who owned
a large acreage but whose professional income is more than 50076 of
his gross. If the term "individual" means a tenant or farm laborer,
then these would be individuals "actively involved" on the farm and
who presumably therefore could petition to create an agricultural area.
All of this raises questions about the qualifications of petitioners. Since
land cannot be included in an agricultural area without the owner's
consent, perhaps it should not matter who petitions if the land qualifies
and should be preserved.
3.

The nature and extent of land uses other than active farming
within the proposed area and adjacent thereto.'20

4.

County development pattern and needs.' 2'

117. Id. § 1003.01. Crops, livestock and livestock products are defined to include but are not limited to the following: "legume, hay, grain, fruit, and truck
or vegetable crops, floriculture,, horticulture, mushroom growing, nurseries, orchards,
forestry and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and feeding of livestock or poultry,
including dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle, pony and horse protection,
fur, fish and wildlife farms, farm buildings used for growing, harvesting and preparing crop products for market ... " Id. § 1003.02.
118. Id. § 1008(a)(2).
119. Id. § 1003.06.
120. Id. § 1008.08(a)(3).
121. Id. § 1008.08(a)(4).
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The existence of county zoning and regional planning would be
of help in considering this factor. Without these the county board
and area committee would have to rely heavily on subjective
information.
5. Any other matters which may be relevant'22
If the proposed area includes land within a one and one-half mile
radius of a municipality's corporate limits, municipal authorities must
be notified and if objections are presented to the county board within
thirty days, such land must be excluded.' 2 3
Within forty-five days of submission the county board must adopt
or reject a proposal.' 24 Once established, the area is to exist for ten
years.2 ' At the end of that time and every eight years thereafter the
county board must conduct a review to determine if the area should
continue and the area committee is required to hold a hearing and
make recommendations to the board.' 2 6 Also at the end of ten years,
landowners in the area may petition for dissolution.' 2 7
Several sections of the law are devoted to procedures under which
''any person" may petition to have land withdrawn from the area.' 2 8
Following a hearing and receipt of recommendations from the area
committee the board must within ninety days either accept or reject
by the
the petition for withdrawal.' 29 Any person adversely affected
3
board's decision is entitled to administrative review.1 0
Inclusion of land in an agricultural area does not assure its preservation for agricultural purposes. Not only may land be withdrawn
on petition, but there is no curb on taking by eminent domain. A
bill introduced in the Illinois legislature in 1981 would have provided
immunity from taking by eminent domain after the area had been

122. Id. § 1008.08 (a)(5).

123. Id. § 1009.
124. Id. § 1010.

125. Id. § 1005.

126. Id. § 1016.

127. Id. § 1017 (Such petition must be submitted in writing to the County Board

during the 120 day period immediately prior to the 10th anniversary of the creation

of the area. If the petition contains signatures of at least 2/3 of the landowners
within the area, the area shall be dissolved).
128. Id. §§ 1012-1015.
129. Id. § 1015.

130. Id. § 1015(3) (The adversely affected person must file his petition for review
within 35 days after the decision).
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in operation for one year.'"' It failed to pass.' 32
Other proposals, such as limiting the kinds of projects which will
permit eminent domain and review of eminent domain petitions by
a special review board established at the state level, have been
suggested.
Also, any preservation guarantees that do exist terminate in ten
years unless steps are taken to keep the area alive for another eight
years.' 3
The primary protection of agricultural lands provided by the Act
may be seen in three pertinent sections of the law. Section 1018 prohibits local governments from unreasonably restricting farm structures
and practices absent a direct relationship to public health or safety.' 34
This raises several questions. Would a home-rule county be
restricted as much as a non home-rule county? What is "an
unreasonable restriction" on farm buildings or on farm practices?
When does a restriction bear a "direct relationship to the public health
or safety"? The validity of regulations is dependent on proper exercise of the police power which means that they must protect the public
health, safety, and welfare. Thus any rule which meets this test of
validity would bear a direct relation to the public health and safety
and would be enforceable in an agricultural area. In short, though
the language sounds protective, it may in application add nothing to
rules currently existing.
Another section imposes a limitation on special assessments and
ad valorem levies.' 33 The purpose of this provision is to help keep
taxes from driving land out of agricultural production. It will no doubt
131. S. 0511, 82nd Gen. Assemb., 1 Sen. J. I11.267 (1981) (introduced on April

1, 1981 the bill passed in the Illinois Senate on a 44 to 5 vote and was sent to
the Illinois House).
132. S. 0511, 82nd Gen. Assemb., I1l. House J. 3310 (1981). In the Illinois House,
the bill emerged from committee on June 11, 1981 with a "do not pass" recommendation. Two days later the bill was tabled.
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 1016 (1983).
134. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 5, § 1018 ("No local government shall exercise any

of its powers to enact local laws or ordinances within an agricultural area in a manner which would unreasonably restrict or regulate farm structures or farming unless
such restrictions or regulations bear a direct relationship to the public health or
safety.")
135. Id. § 1020 ("No political subdivisions providing public services such as
sewer, water or lights or for nonfarm drainage may impose benefit assessments or
special ad valorem levies on land used for primarily agricultural production . . .
unless such service is provided to the landowner on the same basis as others having
the service.")
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have some effect, but there are two limitations expressed in the provision itself-and at least one conceivable conflict with the assessment and taxation powers of a soil and water conservation sub-district.
By the terms of the limitation it does not apply to levies and
assessments imposed prior to formation of the area; and it does not
apply if the service for which the assessment or levy is made "is provided to the landowner on the same basis as others having the service." ' 36 This appears to state only what is equitable-that a farm
pay for electricity and water like everyone else.
The third protective section expresses the policy applicable to all
state agencies. Their administrative regulations and procedures are to
be modified to "encourage the maintenance of viable farming in
agricultural areas" insofar as this is consistent with "the promotion
of public health and safety and with the provisions of any federal
statutes, standards, criteria, rules, regulations, or policies, and any
other requirement of federal agencies, including provisions applicable
only to obtaining federal grants, loans, or other funding."' 37 As a
statement of desirable policy one cannot criticize this provision, but
as a significant curb on the conversion of farmland to other uses,
it is likely to have little effect.
While the objectives of the Agricultural Areas law are laudable,
and it is receiving some usage,' 38 it is not likely to play an important
role in saving farmland. It does not currently contain the "teeth"
needed to prevent invasion by other uses, and the legal procedures
for establishing an area pose jurisdictional problems which could
require costly legal assistance if there are stubborn objectors to
formation.
VI.

ZONING-THE

AGRICULTURAL

EXEMPTION AND THE NON-

CONFORMING USE

"Today, zoning is one of the most frequently used . . .devices
for controlling depletion of agriculture lands. However, there has not
yet been a solid indication of its effectiveness."' 39
In 1935 the Illinois legislature adopted a law providing for county
zoning.' 40 Six years earlier, in 1929, counties were authorized to
136. Id.
137. Id. § 1019.
138. In a letter dated August 12, 1983 to the author, Richard L. Clemmons,
Director of the Division of Local Government for the Illinois Farm Bureau, stated
that either 16 or 17 areas had been organized in 10 counties and that four more
were under consideration. These four would include three additional counties.
139. Hanna, supra note 8, at 424.
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 3151-3162 (1983).
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establish regional planning commissions."' Though the legislature had
its priorities right, many of the fifty-two counties in Illinois which
now have county zoning did not base their ordinances on a well conceived regional plan.'" 2
Three features of the Illinois law are conducive to the preservation of land for farming: the ability of the zoning commission to
establish agriculture districts and define permitted non-agricultural uses
within them; the "agricultural exemption";'"" and the prohibition
against depriving "the owner of any existing property of its use or
maintenance for the purpose to which it is then legally devoted.""'
Agricultural districts. At least four factors condition the effectiveness of the agricultural zone in preserving farmland: the strength
of the commitment to preserve farmland as expressed in the zoning
commission's statement of policy; the selection of zone boundaries;
the definition of "agriculture"; and permitted non-agricultural uses
within the zone.
An example of a strong policy statement is that contained in the
Washington County zoning ordinance:
The carrying out of agricultural activities has long been, and
continues to be, an important part of the way-of-life for Washington
County residents, and such activities provide a large portion of the
income derived by the County's population. Thus, to promote and
protect this mainstay of the local economy, it has been established
as official policy that the County should protect, preserve, and encourage the pursuit of agriculture by its residents. The creation of

"A" Agricultural District is an integral part of that policy. The "A"
District encompasses sparsely developed areas which, because of the
fertility of the soil, topography, the availability of water, and other

factors, including the suitability of the land for the raising of animals,

have high agricultural productivity. The regulations for this district
are intended to preserve such prime agricultural land by severely
restricting the encroachment of non-agricultural uses and structures.
The owners and renters of property, whether farm or non-farm, in
smells,
this district should realize that they will likely encounter 4the
5
operations.'
agricultural
to
attendant
sights and sounds
141. Id.§§ 3001-3007.
142. Telephone conversation on August 29, 1983 with John Quinn, Associate
Director, Bureau of Urban and Regional Planning Research, University of Illinois.
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (1983).
144. Id.

145. Bock, Grossman and McCord, County Zoning, Land Use Controls and
Farmland Protection, ADvIsING FARMERS (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Educa-

tion) 23 (Rev. ed. 1983).
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That Illinois courts will heed the express purpose of preserving
agricultural land as it appears in a county zoning ordinance is well
illustrated by two cases decided in 1981. In Wilson v. County of
McHenry,'" the court resisted a constitutional challenge to a zoning
ordinance establishing an agricultural zone. The plaintiff sought a
change permitting one-acre residential plots on 76 acres of [he plaintiff's 160-acre agricultural lot. There was an adjacent residential
development on wooded and hilly land and it was established that
the plaintiff's land had a lower market value as agricultural land.
In its opinion the court concluded that the predominant land use in
the area was agriculture. The fact that the land had a lower value
when restricted for agricultural use could not alone overcome the
presumption of validity of the ordinance. An expert witness classified
87% of the plaintiff's land as prime agricultural. The court said the
public welfare is served by preserving prime farmland and this was
the stated objective of the ordinance. Further, the court found that
the county had adopted a comprehensive plan of county zoning.
Regarding the plaintiff's economic arguments the opinion said a tract
is not too small for operation as an economic farm unit if it can
be combined with other tracts or if with good management the plaintiff's income from farming could be increased. The court said the
economic loss to the owner must be balanced against the public
47
good. 1
In Pierson v. County of Henry, 4 1 the court did not uphold the
agricultural classification, but the factual situation was so different
that one can say the court by inference did recognize the policy issue
and with a factual setting like that in Wilson would uphold the
ordinance. In Pierson a 20-acre tract was involved, only half of which
was tillable. The 20 acres were within a proposed residential development area in the Henry County land-use plan and there were residences
on all sides of the 20 acres. The tract was worth $8,000 per acre
for residences and $2,500-$3,000 per acre for agriculture.' 49
In determining zone boundaries the zoning commission should
have available the information which would be afforded by a comprehensive regional plan and by a study of the agricultural economy
of the county.
Special consideration must be given to farms lying within the one
and one-half mile radius around municipalities. The act provides that
146.
147.
148.
149.

92 Ill.
App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981).
Id. at 1001-1006, 416 N.E.2d at 428-32.
93 Ill.
App. 3d 320, 417 N.E.2d 234 (1981).
Id. at 323, 417 N.E.2d at 236.
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a municipality may make proposals to the zoning commission and
If the proposals made by a municipality are not incorporated
in their entirety into the ordinance proposed to be enacted by the
county board, the county board shall not enact the proposed zoning
of such area within one and one-half miles of such municipality
except by a three-fourths vote of all members. The zoning commission shall cease to exist, upon the adoption of a zoning ordinance
0
or resolution for such county.'
5
Though Illinois townships may zone,' ' their ordinances are
2
superseded by county zoning.' Information from the Bureau of Urban
and Regional Planning Research at the University of Illinois indicates
3
that only a few Illinois townships have adopted zoning ordinances.'
Thus the impact of township zoning is negligible. However, its effective use to prevent developments inimical to farming in counties that
are not zoned should not be discounted.
The agricultural exemption. The agricultural exemption contained
in section 1 of the Illinois County Zoning law places severe prohibi5
In
tions on zoning that might adversely affect agricultural land.'
repair,
maintenance,
erection,
the
addition, "permits with respect to
alteration, remodeling or extension of buildings or structures used or
to be used for agricultural purposes shall be issued free of any
charge."' 5 5 Though this seems to conflict with the exemption, its purpose is to give zoning authorities the power to determine if the contemplated alteration is "agricultural." If it is, a permit will issue
automatically and without charge. If it is not, a permit will not issue
unless the alteration falls within an allowed non-agricultural use. Commenting on the exception, the authors of County Zoning, Land Use
Controls and Farmland Protection, after pointing out that "agricultural
purposes" are not defined in the law, state:

The Illinois courts have adopted a definition of "agricultural
purpose" so broad that it may include activities only tangentially
agricultural. An early Illinois Supreme Court decision, People ex rel.
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3152 (1983).
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 139, §§ 301-317 (1983).
152. Id. § 302.
153. See supra note 142.
154. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151. The Act states the power conferred by
the Act shall not "be exercised so as to impose regulations or require permits with
respect to land used or to be used for agricultural purposes, or with respect to the
erection, maintenance, repair, alteration, remodeling or extension of buildings or structures used or to be used for agricultural purposes upon such land.
155. Id.
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Pletcher v. City of Joliet, 321 I11. 385, 152 N.E. 159 (1926), dealing
with agricultural purposes as it related to municipal annexation, has
been diligently followed and applied to county zoning cases dealing
with the agricultural exemption. These decisions have effectively
removed all objective criteria such as size, profit, ultimate business
objectives, employment and production from the determination of
whether land is being used for agricultural purposes. County of
Grundy v. Soil Enrichment Materials Corp., 9 Ill. App. 3d 128, 394
N.E.2d 896, 31 I11. Dec. 694 (1979). Presently, counties have little
authority for creating refined distinctions which would restrict incompatible uses on agricultural land. County of Lake v. Cushman,
40 I11. App. 3d 1045, 353 N.E.2d 399 (1976). 56
Commenting further, the authors say:
The legislature sought to ensure the freedom of agriculture in
Illinois by enacting the agricultural exemption while remaining silent
as to the definition of "agriculture." The courts have protected the
dual concepts of "agriculture" and the agricultural freedom from
zoning controls. This has made it possible to introduce uses into
the agricultural district, under the guise of the agricultural exemption, which would ultimately restrict agricultural freedom."
The nonconforming use. The right to continue a nonconforming
use is protected by a provision in the law which states: "The powers
by this act given shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owner
of any existing property of its use or maintenance for the purpose
to which it is then lawfully devoted."' 8
In Douglas v. Village of Melrose Park" the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the right to a nonconforming use under a zoning
ordinance is a property right, and any provisions of such an ordinance
that take away that right in an unreasonable manner or in a manner
not grounded on the public welfare, are unconstitutional.' 6 ° Thus a
farmer may continue his operation in a non-agricultural zone under
either a municipal or county zoning ordinance if he was farming at
the time the ordinance was adopted. But this right is not in perpetuity. It may be legally terminated. There are several bases for terminating. Among them are abandonment of the nonconforming use,
156. Bock, supra note 145, at 23-18.

157. Id.at 23-19. A solution to this shortcoming in the law was proposed by
Bock and Keaton in Illinois County Zoning: A Proposalfor Clarificationand Change
in the Definition of "Agricultural Purposes," published in ILLINOIs RESEARCH, Vol.
19, No. 4 (Fall 1977); See Back, supra note 145, at 23-19-23-22.
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (1983).
159. 389 Ill. 98, 58 N.E.2d 864 (1945).
160. Id. at 101, 58 N.E.2d at 865.
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change to a different use, substantive alterations or expansion of the
use, and expiration of a "reasonable" time period expressed in the
ordinance.
6
Change of ownership,' 6 ' and increased volume of business' are
not grounds for terminating. For abandonment to result in loss of
a nonconforming use right, it must be intentional and more than a
temporary cessation of use.' 6 3 For change in usage to result in loss
of a farming nonconforming use right, there would probably need
to be a shift from farming to a use which the court would define
as non-agricultural. Changes in mode of farming are not likely to
be viewed, perhaps could not under the law be viewed, as a different
use-whereas a change in a manufacturing enterprise from one kind
64
of product or service to another would be so viewed.' In manufacturing "it is the particular use and not the general classification that
governs.''1

65

Zoning ordinances may place a limit on allowable alterations.
Such a limitation would affect a nonconforming agricultural use only
if farm buildings were involved. In Mercer Lumber Co. v. Village
of Glencoe, 166 an ordinance prohibiting alterations or repairs in excess
of 30% of a building's cubic contents was upheld. Ordinances limiting
expansion (usually interpreted to mean taking in additional land) or
67
even prohibiting expansion altogether, have been upheld.' Though
there are no Illinois cases involving the expansion of a nonconforming farm enterprise, a prohibition against such should not apply to
an expansion resulting from the purchase or rental of additional land
outside the prohibited zone.
Ordinances which eliminate nonconforming uses after expiration
of a time period expressed in the ordinance have been upheld by courts
the time period is not
in several jurisdictions-providing
"unreasonable."' 68 Termination by way-of time limitations imposed
on existing nonconforming uses frequently takes the form of "amorApp. 3d 874, 380 N.E.2d
161. See Lubershane v. Village of Glencoe, 63 111.
890 (1978).
162. See Carroll v. Hurst, 103 111.App. 3d 984, 431 N.E.2d 1344 (1982); Village
of Lake Villa v. Fargo Ice & Sons, Inc., 90 111.App. 3d 545, 413 N.E.2d 532 (1980).
163. See Brown v. Gerhardt, 5 111. 2d 106, N.E.2d 53 (1955); Douglas v. Village
98, 58 N.E.2d 864 (1945).
of Melrose Park, 389 Ill.
164. See Dube v. City of Chicago, 7 111.2d 313, 131 N.E.2d 9 (1955).
165. Id.at 322, 131 N.E.2d at 14.
138, 60 N.E.2d 913 (1945).
166. 390 111.
167. Gore v. City of Carlinville, 9 111.2d 296, 137 N.E.2d 368 (1956).
168. See Village of Gurnee v. Miller, 69 111.App. 2d 248, 215 N.E.2d 829 (1966).
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tization" provisions."6 9 Under such provisions the nonconforming user
is given a period of grace during which he is entitled to continue
the use, but at the close of the period the use must end. The theory
behind these provisions is that the value of the user's property interest
is extinguished at the close of the period specified by the amortization schedule. Generally these provisions have been upheld if the period
of time within which the use is required to be terminated is sufficient
for protection of the involved property. '
When zoning ordinances first appeared, Illinois courts were liberal
in protecting nonconforming uses. However, when the question was
whether the uses had been eliminated by alteration, expansion or
change, the courts were not as liberal. In most instances it was felt
that the desirability of community planning, which benefited the
majority, was superior to the rights of the individual property owner
to expand or alter an existing nonconforming use. Ordinances providing for the elimination of nonconforming uses have generally been
upheld. Nevertheless, decisions do appear which indicate that the courts
still weigh the interest of the property owner and the interest of the
community at large in the hope of striking the most favorable balance.
Until recently the courts have been intent on balancing the interests
of the individual and the community, always being careful that the
individual property owner's rights are considered.'"
In view of the many ways in which a nonconforming use may
be terminated and of the vulnerability of a farming operation to
nuisance action when surrounded by residential owners (despite the
Right-to-Farm statute), the nonconforming use right is a tenuous one,
useful more in giving the farmer a period of time to relocate than
in insuring his continued operation. But by the same token there is
an aspect favorable to agriculture; nonconforming uses in an
agricultural zone may be more readily terminated and the land returned
to agricultural use. In this connection it is worth noting that the Illinois Supreme Court held in Goffinet v. Christian County' 2 that where
a shift toward industry was in the county comprehensive plan, rezoning of the land from agriculture to heavy industry, on condition that
upon removal of the plant (synthetic gas production) the land was
to revert to agriculture, was not out of harmony with the plan and
was not invalid as spot zoning.' 73
169.
170.
171.
(1966).
172.
173.

Id. at 250, 215 N.E.2d at 830.
Id.
See Krause, Nonconforming Uses in Illinois, 43 CnI.[-]KENT L.
65 IMI.2d 40, 54, 357 N.E.2d 442, 449 (1976).
Id.

REV.
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VII.

SOIL AND

WATER

CONSERVATION

DISTRICTS

Though Illinois soil and water conservation districts have a promising potential for preserving farm acreage (as an adjunct of preserving the topsoil), this potential has been only modestly realized. Three
provisions in the law are pertinent: those on land use-regulations; environmental impact reports; and soil disturbance."7 '
When the district law was adopted in 193711 5 a provision on landuse regulations contained in a "Standard Act" prepared by the United
States Soil Conservation Service was modified to require that before
a land-use regulation could be adopted, three-fourths of the landowners
in the district must have voted for approval in referendum.' 6 Thus
far no land-use regulations have been adopted by any Illinois district.
Conceivably land-use regulations could be adopted which would indirectly result in the preservation of farm acreage by conserving topsoil and hence permitting farming to compete with non-agricultural
uses.

In 1972 the district's law was amended to provide that the Soil
and Water Conservation District shall make all natural resource
information available to the appropriate county agency or municipality
in the promulgation of zoning ordinances or variances. Any person
who petitions any municipality or county agency in the district for
variation, amendment, or other relief from that municipality's or
county's zoning ordinance or who proposes to subdivide vacant or
agricultural lands therein shall furnish a copy of such petition or proposal to the Soil and Water Conservation District. The Soil and Water
Conservation District shall be given not more than 30 days from the
time of receipt of the petition or proposal to issue its written opinion
concerning the petition or proposal and submit the same to the
appropriate county agency or municipality for further action. " '
Though the municipality and county agency are not bound by
the findings of the district, they are better informed. Furthermore,
in the opinion of the author, the requirement that the district be given
an opportunity to make natural resource information available is
jurisdictional, and failure of the petitioner to supply a copy of his
petition to the district would disqualify the petition for consideration
by the granting agency. At first blush Concerned Citizens for McHenry,
Inc. v. City of McHenry"8 appears to contradict this assumption.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 106-138.10 (1981).
Id.§ 128.
Id.
Id.§ 127.2a.
76 Ill. App. 3d 798, 395 N.E.2d 944 (1979).
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There the Soil and Water Conservation District refused to make a
land-use report because the petitioner had not paid the requested fee.
The court held that this did not invalidate the petition and that under
the law the district had a duty to make a report. It said "if the District
refuses to analyze a petition because a fee has not been paid, it appears
to us that the District is ignoring its duty to the public to report on
the water and soil conditions which may arise from the proposed
'

use.

179

Many Illinois districts have taken this- provision seriously and have
employed the use of experts in making surveys on land affected by
the petition. 8 ' Findings concerning soil structure, drainage and erosion
potential are especially pertinent. A petition could be denied by the
petitioned agency because of the adverse impact of proposed development on any of these, thus preserving the land for farming.
In 1978 the district's law was again amended to provide for the
establishment of guidelines for erosion and sediment control, 8 ' the
purpose being to control "land disturbing activities."' 8 2 First the State
developed guidelines; then based on these, each district developed
guidelines for erosion and sediment control.' 3 By 1983 this objective
had been accomplished. Under these guidelines, soil loss limits are
established. If an owner or occupier after due notice and an opportunity to comply, fails to stay within the limit, hearings may be held
by the district and state department of agriculture and findings of
the department published.' 4 The incentive for an owner to comply
is the fact that his failure will be published. Since districts cannot
tax or assess and receive only token amounts for some administrative
costs from the state, it is not likely that their enforcement authority
will be enlarged by law unless adequate funds are at the same time
made available to enforce the soil loss standards.
Though there are enforcement shortcomings in the district law
(depending on one's point of view), much that is helpful is taking
place in the educational and action area. Illinois was a pilot state
in testing a U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation system
for evaluating agricultural lands with the purpose of conserving prime
agricultural land and guiding local developments needing additional
land. The system is called LESA (Land Evaluation and Land Site
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 801, 395 N.E.2d at 946.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 138.5 (1983).
Id. § 138.3.
Id. §§ 108.12, 138.3(c).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 106-138.10 (1981).
184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 138.8 (1983).
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Assessment). 's Some success has been claimed for the system in
DeKalb and McHenry Counties.' 6 Significant also is the establishment by the Association of Illinois Soil and Water Conservation
Districts of a Prime Farmland Protection Committee and the employment of a farmland protection coordinator.' 8 7
VIII.

ADDITIONAL LAWS AFFORDING SOME PROTECTION

Many laws not based on any policy regarding the preservation
of farmland affect the present and future use of farmlands. Probate
laws, inheritance and descent rules, farm credit laws, and our myriad
of property law rules, are examples. Thus selecting for discussion
additional laws affording some protection is highly subjective and the
8
author will bow to anyone who would make a different selection.' ,
A.

SPECIAL VALUATION OF FARMLAND FOR

ASSESSMENT PURPOSES

The Illinois legislature has enacted two laws which reduce the
taxes to be paid on farmland-especially on farmland where the land
value is inflated by the imminence of urban development. One law
provides that farmland be assessed at 33 1/3% of its fair cash value
"based upon the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale for
99189
use by the buyer for farming or agricultural purposes... .
The other law, more complex than the above and of more
significance, provides for the assessment of farmland based upon productivity "to achieve equitable assessment of farmland within and
between counties."' 9° A Farmland Assessment Technical Advisory
Board, appointed by the Director of Revenue, provides data and
guidelines to be used by county assessment officials and the county
Farmland Assessment Review Committee, the latter a five-man committee consisting of the county assessment official, the chairman of
the county board of review, and three members appointed by the chairman of the county board.' 9'
185. See Impacts, supra note 11, at 6-8.
186. Id. at 22-30.
187. Id. at 36, 37.

188. The laws discussed aid in keeping land in agricultural production by reducing taxes on farmland, giving further protection from unwanted water, replacing topsoil and permitting farmers to destroy predators which could damage crops or interfere
with a successful livestock operation.
189. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501(a)-I to. 501(a)-3 (repealed 1983).
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501(e) (1983).
191. Id.§ 501(e)(3).
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The statute adopts the definitions of the U.S. Census Bureau for
cropland, permanent pasture and other farmland.' 92 Using these definitions, the statute then assesses each designation of land at a specified
value according to the equalized assessed value of its soil productivity index.' 9 3 The soil productivity index is defined by the Department; however, it can be limited by slope, drainage, ponding, flooding,
and field size and shape.' 9 4 Permanent pasture and other farmland
are assessed at one-third and one-sixth of productivity "index equalized
assessed value as cropland,""' respectively, while wasteland is assessed
based on its contributory value to the farmland parcel." It is important to note that the one-third assessment for permanent pasture and
one-sixth assessment for other farmland are minimum limits. 9 ,
The constitutionality of this provision has been tested and
upheld. 9 ' Though this tax concession to agriculture will enhance the
ability of farming to economically compete with pressures for other
uses, in the long run only temporary relief is provided. When the
pressure drives the price of fringe-area farmland high enough to overcome the advantage of lower taxes and the disadvantage of having
to pay additional back taxes computed without respect to the concession, the farmer will sell-though he may for awhile resist and be
content with the lesser income from farming.
B.

LIMITATIONS ON NON-AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE:
TEMPLETON v. HUSS

Under the civil law rule of drainage adopted by Illinois courts'9 9
and adhered to ever after, there are two rules which are sacrosanct:
thou shalt not change the point at which your surface water flowing
in a natural depression enters a lower owner;2"' and thou shalt not
burden him with water from another watershed."0 ' But within these
rules much can be done to improve the drainage of farmland. Depressions can be cleaned, widened, straightened, and deepened.2"2 Small
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. O'Connor v. A&P Enterprises, 81 111.
2d 260, 408 N.E.2d 204 (1980).
199. See Gillham v. Madison Co. R.R., 49 111.
484 (1869); Gormley v. Sanford,
52 111.
158 (1869).
200. Id.
201. Fenton & Thompson R.R. Co. v. Adams, 221 111.
201, 77 N.E. 531 (1906).
202. Id.
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ponds and low places can be drained (in the natural direction of
overflow),20 3 and tile can be installed. These rights have evolved from
more than a century of court decisions and have come to be regarded
as "good husbandry" exceptions to a strict interpretation of the civil
law rule.
In Templeton v. Huss,2"" a subdivision development caused the
flooding of the plaintiff's cropland. The defendant argued that he
was operating within these exceptions and that there was no change
in point of entry or the watershed. The appellate court found the
defendant's contention to be true and refused to grant relief.2" 5 The
Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the point of entry and watershed
prohibitions had not been violated but went on to say that the "good
husbandry" of farmland was not involved and that the damage to
the plaintiff's cropland was "beyond the policy of reasonable use"
and therefore unlawful.20 6 That the agricultural community regarded
this case as important for the preservation of farmland on the boundaries of municipalities is substantiated by the filing of an amicus
curiae brief by the Illinois Agricultural Association2 7 and by passage
of a law in the Illinois legislature after the adverse ruling in the
appellate court, requiring that subdivision developers provide drainage
facilities to prevent excessive runoff on servient lands.2"'
C.

STRIP MINING-THE TOPSOIl, REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENT

Illinois farmers and others interested in the preservation of Illinois
farmland have for a long time been concerned about the inroads of
strip mining.
The concerns expressed from many quarters2 "9 eventually resulted
in both federal and state legislation designed to preserve stripped land
for agricultural use. The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act2" ' is administered by the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement in the Department of the Interior. Commenting on this law, Bock, Grossman, and McCord say:
At the heart of the Act are provisions for the control of the
environmental effects of surface coal mining, which, in essence, re203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
LAND &
210.

Peck v. Herrington, 109 111.611 (1884).
57 II. 2d 134, 311 N.E.2d 141 (1974).
Templeton, 9 Il1. App. 3d 828, 292 N.E.2d 530 (1973).
Templeton, 57 111.2d at 139, 311 N.E.2d at 146.
147 PRAIRIE FARMER, No. 4, 80 (Feb. 15, 1975).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 2 (1981).
Hannah & Vandervijet, Strip Mining versus Agriculture in Illinois, XV J.
PUB. UTIL. ECON. 296 (August 1939).
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1979).
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quire coal operators to secure a permit before mining and to reclaim
surfacemined land to its pre-mined condition. Enforced by the Office
of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM") within
the Department of the Interior, the Act established a two-stage program to regulate surface mining: an initial or interim phase and the
subsequent permanent program. 30 U.S.C. § 1252,1253,1254. Regulations promulgated by OSM govern both phases. The Act is a program of cooperative federalism; states can enact and administer
regulatory programs structured to meet their own particular needs,
if the programs meet or exceed the environmental protection standards established by the Act and the accompanying regulations.
Among the reclamation requirements of SMCRA are numerous
provisions that apply specifically to prime farmland. The requirements
are structured to ensure that mined prime farmland will be restored
to its original productivity. For purposes of the Act, prime farmland
is defined as land classified as prime farmland by the Secretary of
Agriculture, on the basis of factors such as moisture, temperature,
chemical balance, and erosion characteristics. 30 U.S.C. § 1291 (20).
In accordance with this statutory requirement, OSM regulations have
adopted a comprehensive definition of prime farmland promulgated
by the secretary of Agriculture. 7 C.F.R. Part. 657. In addition,
land categorized as prime farmland for purposes of SMCRA must
"historically have been used for intensive agricultural purposes." 30
2
U.S.C. § 1291(2); 30 C.F.R. § 716.7(b)(c). '
Illinois has had strip mining legislation for many years.2" 2 The
most recent law, the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and
Reclamation Act, 2 3 was enacted in 1979. It is administered by the
Department of Mines and Minerals. One of its purposes is to implement the policies of the federal law. One of the key provisions in
the law is that:
Affected land shall be restored to a condition capable of supporting the uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any
mining, or higher or better uses of which there is reasonable
likelihood, so long as such use or uses do not present any actual
or probable hazard to public health or safety or pose an actual or
probable threat of water diminution or pollution. The permit applicant's declared proposed land use following reclamation shall not
(1) be impractical or unreasonable, (2) be inconsistent with applicable
land use policies and plans, (3) involve reasonable delay in implementation, or (4) violate Federal, State, or local law. 2 '
211. Bock, supra note 145, at 23-72.

212. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96, §§ 7901.01-7909.08 (1981).
213. Id. § 7903.03.

214. Id. § 7902.08.
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The Illinois law contains provisions not only for the restoration
of prime farmland215 but also for the restoration of "high capability
land" which can be reclaimed for row-crop farming.2 16 The statute
defines high-capability land2" 7 and specifies how the land is to be
reclaimed. 28
Though these legislative efforts emphasize the importance of
retaining a productive farmland base, they cannot insure that all
stripped land will be returned to farming. Not- only are there problems with definition, but two important variables will continue to
play a role: the strength of the will to make the law effective (in
whose camp is the administering agency?) and the rate of growth of
the pressure for food and fibre production as opposed to the growth
of need for coal.
D.

THE FARMER'S RIGHT TO DESTROY HARMFUL WILDLIFE

The extent of the farmer's right to destroy wildlife harmful to
his animals and crops is admittedly a minor consideration, it is, in
view of the increased pressure to preserve and protect wildlife, of
increasing importance. If the number of wild geese make it impossible to grow late harvested grain crops near their winter habitat or
coyotes make it impossible to use non-tillable farm pasture areas for
livestock, the agricultural usage of such acreage may be discontinued.
There are two partial answers to a farmer with such a problem-one
is an Illinois law under which he may receive a permit from the Department of Conservation to destroy such animals. 2" 9 The other is pronouncement by the courts that despite the issuance or non-issuance
of a permit from the state wildlife or conservation agency, he has
a constitutional right to destroy such if it is necessary to protect his
property.2"' The impact which damage caused by predators or other
wildlife may have on the use of farmland is accentuated by court
decisions holding that an injured farmer has no right to recover
damages from the State-though the State "owns" the wildlife and
may in fact have propagated the species causing the harm. 2 ' In an
215. Id. § 7903.07.
216. Id.
217. Id. at § 7903.07(d).
218. Id. at § 7903.07(b).
219. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 61, § 2.37 (1983). The statute excludes game birds
or migratory game birds. Id.
220. Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1981); See also Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d
1357 (1971).
221. Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1916) exemplifies this view.
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earlier day, before growth in the desire to protect virtually all species
of wildlife, an opposite view prevailed and bounties were paid for
the destruction of many species.222
IX.

OTHER LEGISLATIVE POSSIBILITIES

One commentator223 has suggested two devices not currently
available in Illinois: the purchase of development rights by a local
government agency22 " and transfer of development rights to private
developers.225 Under this latter device the local governmental unit determines the size of the agricultural area to be retained and supervises
the transfers. Both of these devices require, at the local level, organization and expertise which does not now exist. Whether or not such
provisions could be useful in Illinois depends on the nature of the
laws establishing them and on the efficiency with which the program
would be administered at the local level. Involvement of an appropriate
state agency is implied, at least to provide guidance. Another possibility
is the adding of additional incentives to make the agricultural areas
law more effective. Further tax and assessment concessions and restrictions on eminent domain are possibilities-though legislative efforts
to provide for the latter have thus far failed.
X.

CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT

Though this article deals with the law, the importance of "extralegal" citizen involvement in the preservation of Illinois farmland
deserves mention. In Holding Our Ground2 6 there are listed 25 citizen
farmland protection groups, most of them organized to oppose specific
local developments. (The Hoot Owl Bottom Organization to oppose
construction of a power cooperative; the Honor Our Earth to block

See also Rummel, Liability of the State for Damage Done by Protected Wild Animals,
AMERICAN RIFLEMAN, September 1965, at 45-47. However, in Martin v. Illinois, 24
Ill. Ct. Cl. 4 (1950) the court held that since the claimant was prohibited from destroying wild geese and was therefore powerless under the statute to protect his property,
he had a cause of action against the state if negligence could be proved. The court
then overruled a motion to dismiss the complaint. It did not discuss what amounts
to negligence on the part of the state.
222. See Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703 (1976);
and Coggins and Evans, Predators' Rights and American Wildlife Law, 24 ARIZ.
L. REV. 821 (1982).
223. Hanna, supra note 8.
224. Id. at 419.

225. Id. at 420.
226. SAX & BRUNDAGE, supra note 6.
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construction of a regional airport, for example). Several have been
organized to oppose or seek further controls on surface mining. One
of the most effective in this group is the Reclamation Coal-ition with
representatives from seven county boards, eight soil and water conservation districts, two planning agencies, and one municipality.22 7
Several are classified in the directory as "multi-issue" planning
bodies-the Champaign County Development Council Foundation and
the Illinois Council of Watersheds, for example. Such organizations
are effective not only at the local level, but they also spawn needed
legislation and spur action by appropriate local public bodies.
The effective role played by farm organizations with expert lobbyists at the national and state level is part of the citizen involvement. Legislators pay heed to lobbyists' voices out of all proportion
to the percentage of farmers in their constituencies. Illinois has a long
history of strong farm organization involvement in state legislative
and administrative matters.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Since it is not given to man to foresee the future (a few years
or even a decade perhaps yes, but the future is much longer), all
he can do through his laws and institutions is temporarily stem the
tides which move land from one use to another. When pressures for
non-agricultural use reach a certain point, the protective wall will
crumble and any remaining islands of resistance will be submerged.
Economics conditioned by the political process rules. As the agricultural
base is compressed, its importance will increase and agricultural use
will then successfully compete with other uses. There will be a continual balancing of these pulls. The response of national, state, and
local governments to pressure groups will determine for any given
time the balance between agricultural and non-agricultural use. How
much farmland will be needed for the future? Will population growth
be checked, food habits changed, fibre demands reduced, acres for
tobacco, alcohol and drugs reduced, exports diminished; will more
food come from the ocean, from space, from hydroponics? These
questions will give rise to speculation about the future need of land
for crop production. However, our current knowledge about the
answers to any of these questions does not indicate that laws like
those discussed in this article should be shelved. When they outlive
their usefulness it will be apparent.
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